Other Deal Trends 2026: Activity Up 1500% in 6 Months

Deals classified under "other" modalities — a category encompassing platform technologies, undisclosed mechanisms, and novel therapeutic approaches that defy clean classification — surged 1500% in six months, climbing from 6 transactions (September 2025–March 2026) to 96 (March–August 2026). This is not statistical noise; it is a structural reallocation of Big Pharma BD capital toward assets and platforms that sit outside the antibody-small molecule-cell therapy taxonomy that has dominated deal flow for the past decade.

The Data — Other Deal Activity, Period over Period

A 16x increase in deal volume across a single six-month window is virtually unprecedented for any modality category in the Ambrosia dataset. For context, even the ADC boom of 2023–2024 peaked at roughly 300–400% period-over-period growth. The "other" category's explosion reflects something deeper than a cyclical correction — it points to pharma's growing appetite for assets that don't fit neatly into existing competitive frameworks. You can benchmark these numbers against historical norms using our Deal Benchmarks tool.

What's Driving the Trend

Pipeline exhaustion in conventional modalities is the primary accelerant. After five years of aggressive dealmaking in ADCs, bispecifics, and GLP-1 adjacencies, the best assets in those spaces have been acquired or partnered. The remaining targets carry either clinical risk (Phase I with limited data), commercial risk (late-stage in crowded indications), or both. BD teams at top-20 pharma companies are being pushed — by their own portfolio strategy groups — to source differentiated assets that create competitive moats rather than incremental improvements in established categories.

Regulatory dynamics are also contributing. The FDA's increasing openness to novel modality designations and adaptive trial designs has de-risked assets that would have been considered too exotic for large-cap pharma even two years ago. Platform deals, in particular, allow acquirers to access multiple candidates across indications without committing to a single clinical bet — a structure that hedges risk while preserving upside. The result: BD teams are writing larger checks for less-defined technology, which is a meaningful behavioral shift.

Capital availability matters too. With pharma balance sheets flush from GLP-1 revenues at Novo Nordisk and Lilly, and Amgen, AstraZeneca, and Novartis all sitting on significant dry powder after recent divestitures and revenue beats, the willingness to explore non-consensus bets has increased. When your core franchise is generating $10B+ annually, a $1–2B platform deal is a rounding error with asymmetric upside.

Notable Deals

The CSPC–AstraZeneca deal is the standout. At $18.5B in total deal value with a $1.2B upfront, this is one of the largest other-modality licensing transactions ever recorded. AstraZeneca's willingness to write a check of this magnitude for a Chinese-origin asset classified outside traditional modality buckets signals that the company's BD strategy has shifted from incremental pipeline filling to platform acquisition. The fact that a second CSPC–AstraZeneca deal appeared three days later at $1.77B TDV suggests this is a multi-asset relationship, not a one-off.

Novo Nordisk's $2.4B Omeros deal is equally telling. Novo has historically been disciplined — almost conservative — in its BD approach, preferring internal development and bolt-on acquisitions in metabolic disease. A $2.4B commitment to an Omeros asset outside Novo's traditional comfort zone indicates the company is diversifying aggressively, likely in anticipation of GLP-1 competitive pressure in 2028–2030.

BridgeBio's $105M upfront from Novartis, while smaller in absolute terms, reinforces a pattern: Novartis continues to use upfront-heavy structures to secure optionality on novel platforms. For biotech founders, the BridgeBio deal offers a useful comparable — use the Ambrosia calculator to see how your upfront stacks against this benchmark.

What This Means for BD Teams Right Now

If you're a biotech with a differentiated platform that doesn't fit cleanly into antibody, small molecule, or cell therapy boxes, you are in the strongest negotiating position in at least three years. This is a seller's market for novel-modality assets, and the data proves it: 96 deals in six months means multiple pharma companies are competing for the same limited pool of differentiated assets. Use that leverage.

Tactically, BD teams on the sell side should be pushing for higher upfronts and more favorable milestone structures. The CSPC–AstraZeneca deal — with its $1.2B upfront on an $18.5B TDV — implies an upfront-to-TDV ratio of approximately 6.5%, which is below the historical median for large platform deals. If you're negotiating a deal in this range, argue for 10–15% upfront-to-TDV ratios, citing competitive interest and the current demand environment.

For buy-side BD teams, the imperative is speed. The window for acquiring differentiated other-modality assets at reasonable valuations is narrowing. Every month that passes adds more data points — like the CSPC and Omeros deals — to the comparable set, which ratchets up seller expectations. If you have a target in diligence, accelerate the timeline. Waiting for Q4 2026 data will cost you 20–30% in deal terms.

Deal structures are also evolving. We're seeing a shift toward multi-asset platform deals (the dual CSPC–AstraZeneca transactions) and larger equity components alongside traditional licensing economics. BD teams should be prepared to negotiate hybrid structures that combine licensing rights, co-development options, and equity stakes — especially for earlier-stage platforms where clinical milestones are further out.

Benchmark your deal against current market rates using the Ambrosia calculator. With 96 other-modality deals now in the dataset, the tool provides statistically meaningful comparables for upfront payments, milestone structures, and royalty rates across this rapidly growing category.

Frequently Asked Questions

What qualifies as an "other" modality deal, and why is this category growing so fast?

The "other" classification captures deals involving platform technologies, undisclosed mechanisms, radiopharmaceuticals, microbiome therapeutics, gene editing variants, and other approaches that don't map to standard modality taxonomies. Growth is driven by pipeline exhaustion in conventional categories: after years of aggressive ADC, bispecific, and GLP-1 dealmaking, the highest-quality remaining assets increasingly fall outside traditional buckets. The 1500% surge from 6 to 96 deals reflects pharma's strategic pivot toward differentiated, hard-to-replicate platforms. This trend is structural, not cyclical.

Are other licensing 2026 deal terms more favorable for sellers or buyers?

The data strongly favors sellers. With 96 deals executed in six months and multiple large-cap pharma companies competing for differentiated assets, biotech licensors have meaningful leverage. The CSPC–AstraZeneca deal's $1.2B upfront and BridgeBio's $105M upfront from Novartis both landed at or above historical medians for their respective deal sizes. Sellers with competitive processes and multiple term sheets should target upfront-to-TDV ratios of 10–15%, compared to the 5–8% range that was standard in 2024. Use our Deal Benchmarks to validate your positioning.

How should BD teams adjust their sourcing strategy in light of other deal trends 2026?

Buy-side teams need to expand their sourcing aperture beyond traditional modality-specific scouting. The 96 deals in the March–August 2026 window suggest that waiting for assets to de-risk through conventional clinical milestones will price you out of the best opportunities. Early engagement with platform-stage companies — even pre-IND — is increasingly necessary. Structurally, multi-asset deals like the dual CSPC–AstraZeneca transactions offer better economics than single-asset licenses, so BD teams should negotiate portfolio-level access wherever possible. Speed of diligence and term sheet delivery is now a competitive differentiator, not just an operational preference.